






Briefing: Low-income voters in UK 




This report draws on three decades of high-quality survey data to present 
one of the most comprehensive studies of low-income voters to date. It 
presents seven key messages for Britain’s two main parties, as well as all 
those in the political arena more generally, to tackle the injustice of poverty 
and embrace an agenda which unlocks opportunities for people on low incomes.  
 
Matthew Goodwin, University of Kent 
Oliver Heath, Royal Holloway University of London 
 
Key messages:  
 Low-income voters are ‘up for grabs’ like never before. In 2017 Labour enjoyed 
their highest support among low-income voters since the heyday of Tony Blair, 
and the Conservatives enjoyed their strongest support among low-income voters 
since the era of Margaret Thatcher. Although people on low incomes are still more 
likely to vote Labour than the Conservatives, both parties increased their share of 
the vote among this group relative to 2015 (Labour by 13 percentage points and 
the Conservatives by five percentage points). 
 Low-income voters have become more volatile over time. Today, they are less 
tribally loyal to one party. Between 2010 and 2017, consistently more than 50% of 
low-income voters either changed whether they voted or not between elections, 
or changed which party they supported. This means that they are more open to 
being persuaded to change sides; this further underlines why the parties should 
engage with them. 
 Low-income voters are engaging in politics to a greater degree. Between 2015 and 
2017, their rate of turnout increased by seven percentage points. This is the first 
noteworthy increase for 30 years. After a long period in which their political voice 
had diminished, low-income voters have become more involved in politics and 
want to talk to the parties. 
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 Low-income voters are feeling squeezed by changes in the economy. Today, they 
are just as likely to say that their households are struggling financially as they were 
during the 1992 and post-2008 crises. Furthermore, they are not sure who to 
blame for the current situation, which underlines how both Labour and the 
Conservatives could benefit by making a clearer case about how they will improve 
the economic situation of low-income voters.  
 All of our findings reveal why Britain’s main parties need to focus on this key group 
and refresh their offer. For Labour, this is necessary to retain their historic lead 
over the Conservatives, which in recent years has been declining. For the 
Conservatives, reviving their offer to low-income voters could help them build and 
expand upon their recent gains. To do this, Britain’s main parties will have to 
appeal to low-income voters’ desire for greater economic redistribution, as well as 
be sensitive to their values preferences. These voters are ‘cross-pressured’; they 
lean to the left on economic issues but often lean to rightwards on issues like law-
and-order, migration and Brexit. 
 Our findings suggest that amid a volatile and divisive Brexit debate concerns to do 
with economic fairness between rich and poor are once again at the fore of voters’ 
decision-making. Older ‘left-right’ divides have re-emerged and are once again 
important. In terms of winning over low-income voters there are very good 
reasons for the main parties to redouble their efforts to offer more redistributive 
policies, especially amid Britain’s ongoing Brexit debate. 
 All of these findings and the implications for the main parties were reflected at the 
outcome of the 2017 general election. Labour was more successful in low-income 
Britain because they tapped into the left-wing economic views of low-income 
voters. They can build on this success, but they need to be mindful about low-
income voters’ attitudes towards crime and law and order, as well as Europe, and 
think about how they can bolster living standards. The Tories have considerable 
potential among this group because they are closer to low-income voters on issues 
like Europe and crime. If the Conservatives switch toward an economic message 
that has more resonance among low-income voters they could unlock even more 





   
www.jrf.org.uk   3 
Introduction  
British politics is going through a period of considerable flux. In the space of just three 
years the country witnessed an independence referendum in Scotland in 2014, a 
surprise Conservative majority at the 2015 general election, the rise of Jeremy Corbyn 
to become leader of the Labour Party, a referendum on Britain’s European Union (EU) 
membership in 2016, and another general election in 2017, which against most 
predictions produced a hung parliament.  
 
The 2016 referendum and its outcome injected a new and divisive issue into the heart 
of British politics. It also produced a series of knock-on events that have rattled the 
political system: the resignation of Prime Minister David Cameron; the arrival of Prime 
Minister Theresa May; the refusal of parliament to endorse May’s proposed 
Withdrawal Agreement, which included the single biggest defeat of a sitting 
government in British history; the calling and then defeat of a vote of no confidence in 
Mrs May; and the extension of Article 50. It also saw the outcome of the 2019 
European Parliament elections, in which the insurgent pro-Leave Brexit Party came 
from nowhere to finish in first place and the pro-Remain Liberal Democrats and Greens 
enjoyed a resurgence of support; and then, in June 2019, the resignation of Theresa 
May as leader of the Conservative Party.  
 
Amid all this churn and change, some also argue that the underlying ‘dividing lines’ in 
British politics are changing in important ways.  
 
The traditional view of British politics is that the ‘left versus right’ divide is the principal 
organizing feature of electoral competition. Since 2015, this left-right view of the world 
has been underlined by the rise of Jeremy Corbyn, who claims to speak ‘for the many 
not the few’ and argues that Britain should raise tax on high-earners and corporations 
in order to spend more on low-income and workers who are being held-back, as well 
as people trapped in poverty.  
 
At the same time a second dividing line has long been evident in British politics, often 
referred to as the ‘liberal versus authoritarian’ divide. Whereas the left-right divide 
generally refers to concerns to do with economic equality and collectivism, liberal-
authoritarian values relate more strongly to matters of personal freedom (Rokeach 
1973). This relates more to the role that government should play in society rather than 
the economy. Seen through this alternative lens, what matters to people is not just 
whether parties are satisfying their economic needs but also whether they are 
reflecting traditional values, upholding stability and adopting a tough stance on law 
and order. 
 
But amid Britain’s tumultuous debates over Brexit there has emerged another view 
which emphasises the role of cultural values and identity related to nationalism versus 
internationalism. Since 2014, some have argued that these value divides have become 
key to explaining why Britain experienced things like rise of the UK Independence 
Party, the 2016 vote to leave the EU and further changes that followed, like the rise of 
the Brexit Partyi.   
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In this report we pay special attention to these core values and attitudes and examine 
the role they are playing in reshaping British politics. In particular we examine the 
extent to which values have changed in modern Britain, and the extent to which they 
matter politically now compared to the past. Are left-right values as important as they 
once were? Is there evidence of a liberal-backlash and an authoritarian turn? And how 
does the issue of Europe cut across patterns of political support? 
 
Amid all of these debates lie the people who we are interested in exploring: low-
income voters. As we will see, people who are struggling to get by on low incomes 
have played a critical role in shaping the recent period of turbulence in British politics 
and look set to remain central to the outcome of elections. Low-income voters, as we 
have shown in three previous reports with JRF, are important for several reasons. First, 
they were far more likely to vote to leave the EU than people from wealthy 
households, not least because many have faced what we call a ‘double whammy’, with 
their own lack of qualifications being compounded by a lack of opportunities in their 
local areas. Second, low-income voters were also key to explaining Jeremy Corbyn’s 
surprisingly strong result at the 2017 general election, although their electoral 
potential was still not fully mobilized. And, third, low-income voters are also key to 
deciding the fate of Britain’s main parties in an area that will become central to 
explaining the outcome of the next general election: Scotland. In short, there are 
multiple reasons why all of Britain’s political parties would do well to think about how 
to appeal to, win over, mobilise and hold people on lower incomes. 
 
In this report, we help people fulfil this task by presenting the most comprehensive 
overview of low-income voters in Britain that has ever been undertaken. We look at 
how the turnout, volatility, political choices and attitudes of low-income voters have all 
evolved over the past three decades, from 1987 until 2017. We take a step back and 
examine the bigger picture - and one that will need to be looked at by our political 
parties if they are serious about winning power at the next election. 
 
Political background  
Recent general elections have been highly unpredictable. In June 2017 Britain went to 
the polls for a nation-wide vote for the third time in two years, and for the third time 
the result confounded expectations. The Conservatives were widely tipped to win an 
improved majority but ended up losing ground in an election that produced a hung 
parliament.  
 
For the incumbent Conservative Party, a general election that had been called to 
stamp its authority on parliament ended in a retreat. Under the leadership of Theresa 
May, who had become the party’s leader only eleven months earlier, the Conservative 
Party polled 42.3% of the vote, an increase of 5.4 points on its result in 2015 and its 
highest share of the vote since Margaret Thatcher’s landslide in 1983 (see Figure 1). 
But in the eyes of many it was a pyrrhic victory. The Conservatives won only 317 seats, 
thirteen fewer than in 2015 when David Cameron had won a small but surprising 
majority.  
 
For the Labour Party, meanwhile, an election that some had feared would culminate in 
a historic loss and perhaps a devastating split instead ended with heroic defeat. Prior 
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to the campaign, when in some polls Labour had languished 21 points behind the 
Conservatives, some had talked of the party slumping to its lowest number of seats 
since the 1930s. But under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn, Labour outperformed the 
final opinion polls by an average of five points, receiving 40% of the vote – the party’s 
highest share since Tony Blair’s second landslide in 2001 and the third highest since 
1970.  
 
Figure 1: General election results in the UK, 1918-2017 
 
Yet despite neither party managing to secure an overall majority, one feature of the 
election was the return to dominance of the two main parties. In 2017 both the 
Conservatives and Labour polled over 40% of the vote each for the first time in a 
general election since 1970. 
 
Such trends were mirrored in a slump of public support for ‘the others’, with the share 
of the vote going to parties other than Labour or the Conservatives falling from 32% in 
2015 to just 17.5% two years later. The collapse of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), 
which had campaigned for Brexit, was especially noticeable. Compared to 2015, when 
UKIP had received almost four million votes, only two years later UKIP’s share of the 
national vote dropped from almost 13% to just 1.8%. The Scottish National Party (SNP), 
Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Greens also recorded declines in their vote 
share. 
 
After decades when elections had provided voters with echoes rather than choices, the 
2017 contest was also one where there was a more meaningful policy difference 
between the main parties: Theresa May’s vision of a ‘hard Brexit’ versus Jeremy 
Corbyn’s anti-austerity platform and populist cry to represent the ‘many not the few’. 
Faced with a clear and compelling choice, the 2017 election engaged voters to an 
extent not seen for the last twenty years, with turnout at 69%, the highest since 1997 
(see Figure 2).  
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Yet the return to two-party politics and upturn in participation does not mean that 
mass parties in British politics are now back in the same position as they were in the 
1960s when they dominated the political landscape. Recent elections have taken place 
in a context of extremely high electoral volatility – with more churn than at any other 
time since the end of the Second World War (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Turnout and volatility in general elections, 1918-2017 
 
 
This volatility is a major reason why elections have been so unpredictable. Since 2001 – 
when turnout reached its lowest level since the extension of the Franchise in 1918, 
both turnout and volatility have steadily increased. As more people enter, or re-enter, 
the political process, they appear to be less tied to any one particular political party 
and more likely to switch which party they vote for. In 2017 both main parties 
managed to attract votes from the smaller parties, but there is no guarantee that this 
uneasy coalition will hold. And as the recent European Elections illustrate there is a 
great deal of potential for political fragmentation to increase once again. 
 
In this context of high volatility and political churn, set against the backdrop of Brexit 
uncertainty, the potential for major upheavals in the next general election is 
substantial. While the 2017 general election result defied predictions and also easy 
explanations, the next election – whenever it is called – will also have the capacity to 
surprise. In this report we examine the long-term trends and shine a light on the 
emerging political divides in order to better understand the political trajectory that the 
country is on.  
 
We do so with particular focus on the attitudes and behaviour of those on low 
incomes. 
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Data and methods 
 
To examine the political behaviour and attitudes of people on low incomes we analyse 
a specially constructed dataset which combines each of the face-to-face British 
Election Studies (BES) since 1987ii. This series covers thirty years, eight elections and 
consists of more than 26,000 interviews. The BES face-to-face survey represents the 
gold standard for analysing the behaviour and attitudes of voters in British politics. It is 
based on a nationally representative probability sample and conducted by a team of 
specially trained investigators, who carry out the face-to-face interviews with 
respondents in their homes. Investigators make repeated attempts to contact selected 
respondents, which means that people who are hard to reach or do not typically take 
part in surveys are still included (Mellon and Prosser, 2016). This makes the survey 
much more representative than online or internet surveys.  
 
Another advantage of the BES is that it is carried out just after people voted at a 
general election, when the issues and their voting decision are still fresh in their mind. 
This is particularly important when it comes to turnout, which is not possible to 
analyse in a robust or reliable way using internet surveys which tend to include over-
engaged samples.  
 
The questions in the BES cover a range of topics, from the social and demographic 
backgrounds of respondents to what they think about key issues of the day. Our key 
interest though is the behaviour and attitudes of different income groups, particularly 
those on low incomes. For this report, we use a measure of equivalised household 
income before housing costs, which takes into account the total household income and 
adjusts it for the number of adults living in the household and whether or not there are 
any children living at homeiii. We then construct income groups based on quintiles in 
each election year. We define those on low incomes as the bottom quintile and those 
on high incomes as the top quintile (the highest 20%).  
 
This measure of equivalised income provides a more detailed and robust measure of 
income than we used in our previous reports. We also use high quality face-to-face 
survey data rather than internet samples. As a result some of our estimates differ to 
those published previously. 
 
Low-income voters: turnout, voting behaviour and volatility 
 
Following the 2017 general election, there was a debate about turnout. At 69%, 
turnout was the highest that it had been for two decades, since Tony Blair and New 
Labour’s first landslide election victory in 1997 (Heath and Goodwin, 2017). Much of 
the debate focused on the magnitude of a pro-Labour ‘Youthquake’. Turnout among 
people aged under 30 years old increased by about nine percentage points, though 
whether this qualified as a ‘Youthquake’ was contested. While some analysts have 
argued that a sizeable ‘Youthquake’ did in fact occur (see here and here), others 
suggest that this has been overstated. 
 
   
www.jrf.org.uk   8 
One neglected aspect in this debate on turnout concerns low-income voters. Between 
2015 and 2017, turnout among people on low incomes increased by about seven 
percentage points. This increase is all the more remarkable as it represents the first 
time in 30 years that turnout among those on low incomes has noticeably increased.   
 
Figure 3 displays the probability of voting in a general election for those on high 
incomes and low incomes since 1987iv. The vertical bars indicate the 95 confidence 
intervals – or margin of error. As can be seen, those on low incomes have generally 
been somewhat less likely to vote than those on high incomes, though the size of the 
turnout gap between the two groups has increased substantially since the 1980s. In 
1987, there was no significant difference in the rates of turnout among people on low 
or high incomes. Both registered about the same level of turnout. However, since the 
1980s a significant turnout gap between the two income groups has emerged. And 
whereas turnout has been on the increase among those on high incomes since the low 
water mark of 2001, turnout among those on low incomes has stagnated. In 2015, the 
difference in reported turnout between those on high incomes and those on low 
incomes was 22 percentage points, compared to less than just three percentage points 
in 1987. 
 
Figure 3: turnout by income, 1987-2017 
 
 
The general election of 2017 was the first such contest in thirty years to buck the trend 
of declining turnout among low-income voters. This pattern still holds even if we 
control for a wide variety of other demographic characteristics, such as age, education, 
gender and occupation. After a long period in which their political voice had 
diminished, there is some evidence that low-income voters have once again become 
more involved in the political process. 
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Where did these extra votes from people on low incomes go? At first glance, there are 
reasons to think that both Labour and the Conservatives benefitted. As we 
documented in an earlier report, in 2017, and for the first time in a generation, both of 
Britain’s main parties made a concerted effort to pitch for people on low incomes, 
albeit in slightly different ways. Whereas Prime Minister Theresa May and the 
Conservatives had talked about tackling ‘burning injustices’, the leader of the Labour 
Party, Jeremy Corbyn, offered these voters a range of specific policies amid an 
economically populist agenda, promising to work for ‘the many not the few’ (Goodwin 
and Heath, 2017). 
 
Figure 4 shows the percentage of low-income voters who supported Labour, the 
Conservatives, the Liberals or another party in each general election since 1987, using 
British Election Study face-to-face data. Broadly speaking, those on low incomes are 
much more likely to vote for Labour than the Conservatives or other parties. This was 
particularly true in 1997 and 2001 in the heyday of New Labour when over 60% of low-
income voters supported the party. Support for Labour among those on low incomes 
declined markedly in 2005 – by nearly 20 percentage points, and fell further in 2010 
and 2015 to just 40 percentage points. Meanwhile, support for the Conservatives 
among low-income voters increased during this period. This underlines why Labour 
and the Conservatives have more reason than ever to take low-income voters seriously 
and ensure that the offer to them remains compelling; for Labour, this is about 
retaining a clear lead over the Conservatives among this group while for the 
Conservatives this is about building on recent gains among low-income voters in 2017. 
 
Figure 4: party support among low-income voters, 1987-2017 
 
In 2017 both of the main parties increased their support among low-income voters. 
Under Jeremy Corbyn, support for Labour increased by 13 percentage points among 
those on low incomes to reach 53%. This was the first time that Labour enjoyed 
majority backing among low-income voters since Blair’s second term. Support for 
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Conservatives increased by just under five percentage points to reach 33% among 
people on low incomes. Even though this was the Conservative Party’s highest level of 
support among low-income voters since the era of Margaret Thatcher it still left them 
some 20 percentage points behind the Labour Party among this key electoral group. 
 
We can get a clearer sense of the role that income plays in shaping voting behaviour by 
examining how support for each party varies across different income groups. Figure 5 
displays the probability of voting for each party for those on high incomes and low 
incomes for every general election since 1987. From the top left panel of Figure 5, we 
can see that people on high incomes have generally been more likely to vote 
Conservative than people on low incomes, and from the top right panel we can see 
that the reverse is true for Labour. So, in 1987, support for the Conservatives was 
about 30 percentage points higher among people on high incomes than it was among 
those on low incomes, while support for Labour was about 30 points higher among 
those on low incomes than it was among those on high incomes. During this period 
then a person’s level of income made a big difference to their probability of supporting 
each of the two main parties. 
 
Figure 5: party support by income, 1987-2017 
 
Over time though these differences in party support between income groups have 
become somewhat less pronounced, though they are still visible. In 2017, support for 
the Conservatives was just 12 points higher among people on high incomes than it was 
among those on low incomes while support for Labour was 14 points higher among 
those on low incomes than among people on higher incomes. Both parties have 
therefore become less distinctive in terms of which income groups vote for them. Part 
of the reason for this narrowing is that low-income voters are now somewhat more 
likely to vote Conservative than they were previously and people on high incomes are 
somewhat more likely to support Labour now than they were previously. Nonetheless, 
2017 was notable in that both parties saw their vote share among low-income voters 
   
www.jrf.org.uk   11 
increase (and the Tories saw their vote share among those on high incomes decline 
somewhat). 
 
These findings indicate that, in 2017, low-income voters were more incorporated in 
the mainstream of British politics than they had been for a generation. With turnout 
among low-income voters up, and these voters becoming more visible in the 
electorates of both Labour and the Conservatives, this group has thus come to occupy 
a more important position in shaping the outcome of elections. Both of the main 
parties have good reasons to think seriously about how to keep or attract this group. 
 
Figure 6: rate of volatility by income, 1987-2017 
 
One way to illustrate this is with respect to ‘electoral volatility’, namely the extent to 
which people switch their votes from one party to another, from one election to the 
next. Volatile voters are people who either change the party that they vote for 
between elections or change whether they vote or not. Whereas the overall rate of 
volatility in British politics remained low in the 1980s and 1990s, since the turn of the 
millennium it has increased significantly (Mellon, 2017; Fieldhouse et al. 2019). But we 
can drill down and look in particular at low-income voters.  
 
Figure 6 reveals how, in recent years, these voters have become more volatile, either 
switching their votes among the various parties or switching in-and-out of voting. In 
each election since 2010 more than 50% of low-income voters have either changed 
whether they voted or not between elections, or changed which party they voted for. 
And in 2017 they were significantly more likely than people on middle or high incomes 
to do so. With low-income voters less predictable or stable in their voting behaviour 
than they were in the past, this suggests that parties today have a better chance of 
persuading them to shift their support, provided they offer such voters the right 
messages and policies. This could reap big rewards. Given that 50% of those on the 
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lowest 20% of incomes are ‘volatile’ this could equate to 10% of the electorate – or 
around four million ‘volatile’ low-income voters who are up for grabsv.  
 
Income, occupation, economic evaluations and vote choice 
 
How do income divides in Britain compare to other social and economic divides in the 
country? And which of these are most important when it comes to people choosing 
who to vote for at elections? The study of social inequality in Britain has long been 
concerned with questions of class, measured in terms of people’s occupation. “Class is 
the basis of British party politics”, said academic Peter Pulzer in 1967, “all else is 
embellishment and detail”.  
 
But whereas class was once considered key to understanding British politics, today, in 
the shadow of the 2016 referendum, the prevailing wisdom is that class is less decisive 
relative to other factors, such as age, which some herald as the new dividing line 
(YouGov, 2017). We can further interrogate this by exploring how different classes 
voted at every general election since 1987. Figure 7 presents the probability of voting 
for each party among the middle-class and working-class. We measure class in terms 
of occupation, derived from a modified version of the ‘Goldthorpe class schema’.  
 
Figure 7: Voting by Occupational Class, 1987-2017 
 
 
What do we find? Over the last thirty years the difference between the working class 
who traditionally supported Labour and the middle class who traditionally supported 
the Conservatives has narrowed. In the 1960s, support for Labour was some 40 points 
higher among the working class than the middle class. By 2010 this gap had narrowed 
to less than 20 points. In 2017 it was just five percentage points. In addition, working-
class voters have become more likely to vote for parties other than Labour. In 2017, 
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the Conservatives received their highest ever share of the vote among the working 
class and were just as popular among the working class as they were among the 
middle class (Heath and Goodwin, 2017). This underlines why the next Conservative 
leader would do well to reflect on how his party’s base has been changing over the 
years and how Conservatives can expand their gains among working-class and low-
income voters.  
 
Some interpret the blurring of these boundaries between the choices of the working 
class and middle class to imply that class is no longer important and that other factors 
like age and education are now far more key. However, socioeconomic status is still 
important. It is just that it is increasingly difficult to measure based on people’s 
occupation. The decline of traditional industry means that there are fewer manual 
working-class jobs available while the expansion of the middle class has meant that it 
has become increasingly heterogeneous, and contains people from a whole variety of 
different jobs who may or may not share similar political preferences. 
 
To put this in perspective, next we consider which of the two main parties different 
social groups prefer – and how the political salience of these social divides has 
changed over time.  
 
Figure 8: the changing balance of party support between Conservatives and Labour 
among different social groups, 1987-2017 
 
For simplicity, we focus just on the two-party share of the vote and whether people 
prefer Labour or the Conservatives. Figure 8 plots which of the two parties different 
‘sub-groups’ prefer and how this has changed over time, controlling for 
demographicsvi. If a group is evenly split between the two parties – and gives equal 
support to each - then the probability of supporting one party over the other is 0.5 (or 
fifty fifty). This is illustrated with a red dotted line in each of the figures. Values above 
0.5 indicate that the group in question is more likely to vote for Labour than the 
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Conservatives and values below 0.5 indicate that the group in question is more likely to 
vote for the Conservatives than Labour.  
 
Generally, we can see that those groups most at risk of being trapped in poverty are 
more likely to vote Labour than Conservative (their probability of doing so is generally 
greater than 0.5) – and are more likely to do so than those groups less at risk of being 
trapped in poverty. However, we can see that the divide between different groups 
varies, and also varies over time. The divide between Labour and Conservatives in 
terms of income is greater than it is with respect to occupational class. That is whereas 
in 2017 both the middle class and working class are pretty much evenly split between 
whether they vote Labour or Conservative, those on low incomes are still more likely 
to prefer Labour and those on high incomes are still more likely to prefer the 
Conservatives.  
 
People’s subjective social class also matters, though somewhat less than it used to. 
People who think of themselves as working class are more likely to vote Labour, 
regardless of their actual occupation. By contrast people who think of themselves as 
middle class are marginally more likely to support the Conservatives. Interestingly, the 
way in which education is related to vote choice has recently changed. Historically, 
there wasn’t much difference between which party those with different levels of 
educational qualification supported, once we took account of their occupation and 
income. But in 2017, for the first time, graduates are more likely to prefer Labour over 
the Conservatives, and are more likely than those without any qualifications to do so. 
For the first time then there is evidence of an educational divide in support for the two 
main parties.  
 
The results indicate that claims that class and inequality do not matter politically any 
more have been over-stated. The way in which they matter may have changed – but 
class based on income still plays an important role in shaping how people vote in 
modern Britain, with those on low incomes and people who are the most at risk of 
poverty behaving differently to those on high incomes.  
 
This is also evident in Figure 9, which considers additional indicators of poverty. People 
who are of working age are far more likely than retired people to vote Labour rather 
than Conservative. This divide was somewhat stronger in 2017 than in previous 
elections, reflecting the growing importance of age as an electoral divide. People who 
own their own home, either outright or with a mortgage, are more likely than renters 
(either private, social or council) to vote Conservative rather than Labour. This divide 
has stayed relatively even over time. It is surprising giving the squeeze on property in 
recent years that this has not emerged as a stronger dividing line in party support. 
 
People who are unemployed are much more likely than those working full-time to vote 
Labour than Conservative.  And welfare-recipients are much more likely to vote Labour 
than people whose main source of income comes from work. Although this divide 
narrowed somewhat during the Blair years it is now just as pronounced as it was 
during the late Thatcher years and Major government. Though many of these 
differences disappear when we control for someone’s level of income, suggesting that 
they do not have an independent effect on vote choice over and above how much 
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money someone earns (though of course they may be a contributing factor to their 
level of income in the first place). 
 
Figure 9: the changing balance of party support between Conservatives and Labour 
by work status, 1987-2017 
 
We can drill down further by exploring differences in people’s subjective experiences 
of economic well-being. Evaluations of the economy are often thought to be very 
important determinants of voting behaviour. According to something called the 
‘reward-punishment model’, people tend to reward the government for good 
economic performance by voting for them again or punish them for bad economic 
performance by voting for the opposition. Figure 10 shows how people’s perception of 
their household’s economic situation and also that of the economy varies by their level 
of income.  
 
Generally speaking, people on low incomes are much more likely than those on high 
incomes to say that the financial situation in their household has deteriorated over the 
last year, particularly during periods when there have been pronounced downturns. 
During the Blair years, people on low incomes were much more positive about their 
household financial system than they have been at other periods. But, today, people 
on low incomes are just as likely to say that their household is struggling now as they 
were in the immediate aftermath of the financial crises in 2010, and 1992. By contrast, 
people’s evaluations of whether the national economy has got better or worse over 
the last year do not vary much by income. This suggests that even as Britain has moved 
away from the post-2008 financial crisis and into some more positive macroeconomic 
shifts, such as rising employment, falling unemployment and real wage growth, those 
on low-incomes simply do not believe it. As far as Britain’s low-income voters are 
concerned, they are just as pessimistic about their household’s financial position as 
they were during the economic crises of the early 1990s and post-2008 climate. This 
should worry the Conservative Party, which as we noted above has made up some 
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good ground in recent years among these voters. Clearly, these voters are asking for 
further help to improve their household’s financial position. 
 
Figure 10: evaluations of the economy (saying it got a lot worse) by income 
 
While controlling for other factors, like demographics, people who felt that their 
household’s finances had deteriorated during the past year are generally more likely to 
vote for the opposition than people who think that their household’s economic 
situation improved (see Figure 11). This is in line with the ‘reward-punishment’ model 
of voting behaviour. So, when the Conservatives were the incumbent government in 
1992 and 1997, people who thought that their household finances had got worse were 
more likely to vote Labour than people who thought they had improved. And when 
Labour were the incumbent the pattern reversed, and people who thought their 
household situation had got worse were more likely to vote Conservative.  
 
In recent years, though, these subjective evaluations of the economy appear to be 
somewhat less important than they were previously, perhaps because voters are 
unclear about who to blame for the current economic situation and so are unsure who 
to punish or perhaps because they are unclear about whether things would improve 
much under a Labour-led government and so are unsure who to reward. In either case, 
both parties would stand to benefit from making a clearer case about how their 
policies might help to improve the financial situation of people’s households, 
particularly those on low incomes. 
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Figure 11: household economic evaluations and party support, 1992-2017 
 
Low-income voters and value divides in Britain, 1987-2017 
 
So far, we have seen how low-income voters tend to vote Labour while those on 
higher incomes tend to vote Conservative, although they have become more volatile in 
recent years. This indicates that economic inequality continues to be an important 
influence on people’s choices at elections. Yet low-income voters, and people who are 
in, or at risk of, poverty, also face competing pressures.  
 
People on lower incomes tend to have fewer educational qualifications and so are 
often more likely to favour leaving the European Union and endorsing a range of other 
socially ‘authoritarian’ policies, like strengthening law and order (Ford and Goodwin 
2014). Such views might lead them to vote for the Conservatives. But, at the same 
time, people with few qualifications and those on low incomes also tend to give more 
support to left-wing economic policies, such as a more assertive approach to 
redistributing resources from ‘the few to the many’, which may lead them towards 
Labour (Goodwin and Heath, 2017). 
 
The main parties need to think seriously about these competing influences because 
they were on full display at the 2017 general election. Labour and the Conservatives 
sought to appeal to low-income voters in different ways. While Conservatives pitched 
to the identity concerns that were held by low-income voters, promising to deliver 
Brexit and reduce immigration, Labour pitched to their economic concerns by 
promising to oppose austerity, curb inequality and raise their living standards. In this 
way, the 2017 general election pulled these groups in different directions.  
 
This is linked to a wider debate, as we noted at the outset, about the relative 
importance of different ‘dividing lines’ in politics; whereas some argue that the 
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traditional ‘left versus right’ dividing line is still key, others contend that this is now 
making way for a ‘liberal versus authoritarian’ dividing line or a ‘nationalist-
internationalist’ dividing line which puts value divides rather than debates over 
economic competition at the heart of our politics.  
 
We can explore this more closely by investigating how these divides have evolved over 
the longer-term; what people think about a range of economic and cultural issues; 
how their attitudes have changed over time; and to what extent, if at all, they are 
influencing people’s decisions at the ballot box. 
 
To examine support for the more traditional economic ‘left-right’ divide, we create a 
multi-item index based on people’s attitudes towards economic fairness, redistribution 
and inequality. We draw on three questions that have consistently been asked in more 
or less the same wayvii: ‘Do you agree or disagree that there is one law for the rich and 
one law for the poor?’; ‘Do you agree or disagree that ordinary working people get 
their fair share of the nation's wealth?’; and ‘Some people feel that government should 
make much greater efforts to make people's incomes more equal. Other people feel 
that government should be much less concerned about how equal people's incomes 
are. Where would you place yourself on this scale?’. Taken together, these questions 
tap into whether or not someone holds a broadly left-wing outlook or a broadly right-
wing outlook. The index is created using a statistical technique called ‘principal 
components analysis’, which combines all the responses to these questions into a 
single scale with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Negative values 
therefore indicate a more left-wing position and positive values indicate a more right-
wing position. 
 
To examine support for socially authoritarian values we create a multi-item index 
based on attitudes towards the death penalty, prison sentences, traditional values and 
censorship. Again, we draw on questions that have been asked more or less in the 
same way across all of the surveys. These include asking people whether or not they 
agree with statements like: ‘For some crimes, the death penalty is the most 
appropriate sentence’; ‘People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences’; 
‘Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British values’; and 
‘Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards’. As before, 
the index is created using principal components analysis. Negative values indicate a 
more socially authoritarian position and positive values indicate a more socially liberal 
positionviii.   
 
To examine attitudes towards the EU, we draw on a series of questions that have been 
asked about Britain’s relationship with Europe. Questions about the EU have not been 
asked in a completely consistent way so we have to be a little cautious in terms of how 
we interpret the results. From 1987 to 1997, respondents were asked whether Britain 
should continue or withdraw from the EEC/EC. From 2001 to 2010, respondents were 
asked whether they approved or disapproved of Britain’s EU membership. And, in 
2017, respondents were asked how they would vote if there was another referendum, 
whether they would vote to leave or remain in the EU. We distinguish between 
whether respondents are broadly supportive of the EU (continue/approve/remain), 
broadly negative towards the EU (withdraw/disapprove/leave) or whether they are 
unsure/neutral. This question also taps into the broader ‘nationalist-internationalist’ 
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value divide and as past research has shown is also strong related to attitudes towards 
immigration (Ford and Goodwin 2014). 
 
All of this allows us to paint a comprehensive picture of how values have evolved in 
modern Britain and how attitudes toward left-right issues, liberal-authoritarian issues 
and Britain’s relationship with Europe have changed over time among different income 
groups. Figure 12 begins by showing the pattern with respect to support for left-right 
and liberal-authoritarian values. 
 
The first thing to notice is that people on low incomes tend to hold much more left-
wing attitudes than people on high incomes. This was the case in 1987 and it is the 
case now. There is not much evidence of any long-term change in these values in one 
direction or the other. There is some evidence of short-term change though. Britain’s 
electorate as a whole drifted somewhat to the left during the Conservative years, 
between 1987 and 1997, and then drifted somewhat to the right during the Blair years, 
from 1997 to 2005. This is consistent with what the academic John Bartle calls the 
‘thermostat’ of British public opinion, whereby public opinion moves in response to 
governmental activity. So when government policy goes too far to the right the public 
shifts to the left, and when government policy goes too far to the left the public shifts 
to the right. Since the financial crisis of 2008, there is evidence that the electorate has 
once again tacked towards the left, although this appears to be more pronounced 
among people on high rather than low incomes.  
 
By contrast, there is evidence of a much more gradual and consistent change with 
respect to attitudes towards the ‘liberal-authoritarian’ issues, particularly among those 
on high incomes. Between 1987 and 2017, people on high incomes have become 
gradually and markedly more liberal, and there has been a clear and noticeable change 
since 2010. The steady liberal march was also evident among those on low incomes, 
particularly up until the turn of the century. However, since 2010 there has been an 
‘authoritarian turn’, and people on low incomes are now much more socially 
authoritarian than they were at the beginning of the new millennium. This pattern 
holds even if we control for other factors such as age and education.  
 
Because of these deeper changes, this means that today there is more polarization 
between those on low incomes and high incomes on liberal-authoritarian issues than 
there was in previous years. Whereas those on high incomes are more liberal than ever 
before, those on low incomes are not. There is greater cultural disconnect between 
these two groups than there was in the past. Although this disconnect was visible long 
before Britain voted for Brexit, it has certainly sharpened in the period since the 2016 
referendum.  
 
There is now also more polarization between income groups on liberal-authoritarian 
issues than there is on left-right issues. In 2017, the gap between those on high 
incomes and low incomes is nearly twice as large on liberal-authoritarian issues as it is 
on left-right issues (1.04 vs 0.52). This general pattern still holds if we control for other 
demographics such as age and education, though the difference is somewhat smaller.  
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Figure 12: value change by income group, 1987-2017 
 
 
Figure 13 shows how attitudes towards the specific issue of Europe have changed 
among the different income groups since 1987. We focus on those who have a broadly 
positive outlook towards the EU and those who have a broadly negative outlook. 
Respondents who were unsure or neutral about the EU are treated as a separate 
category (but not shown). What is striking is that regardless of how the question is 
phrased, the pattern is remarkably consistent. Those on high incomes are much more 
positive towards Europe than those on low incomes, and those on low incomes are 
much more negative towards Europe than those on high incomes.  
 
The gap between those on high incomes and low incomes has stayed fairly constant, 
indicating that the structure of these divides are relatively stable over the long-term, 
and thus unlikely to fade anytime soon. And lastly, whereas there is some evidence 
that attitudes towards Europe have become somewhat less positive over time – much 
of this change has been driven by people becoming more unsure. Opposition to 
Europe among low-income voters has been remarkably stable over the past thirty 
years; with about 40% consistently expressing a negative outlook on Britain’s 
relationship with Europe.  
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Figure 13: attitudes towards the EC/EU, 1987-2017 
 
Bringing it all together: how can parties win over low-income voters? 
 
How then do low-income voters choose which party to vote for at elections? Are they 
influenced more by their attitudes toward traditional left-right issues like economic 
fairness and redistribution, or are they more strongly influenced by their attitudes and 
values on the liberal-authoritarian axis? What about the role of Europe? And how 
might the influence of these things have changed over time?  
 
In this final section, we answer these questions by exploring the relative impact of 
these values and political issues on people’s voting decisions since 1987, both in the 
electorate as a whole and then specifically among low-income voters. We present the 
results from a series of models. In each model, we control for basic demographics, 
such as income (in the full model only), age, education, and gender and examine how 
the impact of different values on vote choice vary by year.  
 
In Figure 14, we look at the impact of left-right values on vote choice (left-hand panel) 
and the impact of liberal values on vote choice (right-hand panel) in the electorate at 
large. The figures show the average marginal effect of different values, controlling for 
the effect of the demographic variables already mentioned. So, being right-wing 
increases the probability of voting for the Conservatives by about 20 points in 1987 
(and reduces support for Labour by about the same amount)ix. By contrast, being right-
wing in 2001 only increased support for the Conservatives by about 10 points (and 
reduced support for Labour by less than just 5 points). We can see then that the 
impact of left-right values on vote choice was very important in the 1980s and 1990s, 
but became much less important during the Blair years when the two lines sharply 
converged. Since then though, there has been a re-emergence of left-right issues as an 
electoral divide and the lines have once again diverged. 
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Figure 14: impact of values on vote choice 
 
Turning to the right-hand panel in Figure 14 we can see that socially liberal people 
have always tended to be more likely to support Labour, by about 5 to 10 percentage 
points. There is not much evidence that this has changed substantially over time. 
Indeed, the impact of liberal values on vote choice appears to be remarkably constant 
over the time period that we investigate.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, left-wing attitudes were far more important determinants of 
vote choice than liberal-authoritarian values. During the New Labour era, left-right 
attitudes became much less important, largely because New Labour’s more centrist 
policies meant that there was little ideological difference between the main parties. 
However, since Blair stepped down these left-right issues have become increasingly 
important once again. Despite increased polarization on authoritarian issues in society 
at large there is as yet no evidence that they are more important in elections (though 
they were very important in the referendum). Yet just because they have not yet been 
politically activated, there is no reason why authoritarian values could not be activated 
in the future. Indeed, in the current context concern about crime would appear to be 
ripe for political mobilization. 
 
What then of Europe? Figure 15 shows how support for the Conservative party and 
Labour party are influenced by attitudes towards Europe, controlling for people’s 
background demographic characteristics. In the 1970s and 80s many on the left viewed 
the European project with suspicion. We can see that in the late 1980s Eurosceptics 
were in fact more likely than Europhiles to vote Labour and Europhiles were more 
likely than Eurosceptics to vote Conservative. So, at the time when Jeremy Corbyn first 
entered parliament being anti-Europe was more strongly associated with support for 
the left than it was the right. During the Blair years though this quickly changed and 
support for the Labour party was some 20 points higher among people who were pro-
European than it was among people who were anti-European. The political significance 
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of Europe declined in importance during the Cameron years, particularly with respect 
to support for the Conservative party, but since the vote for Brexit the issue has 
exploded and is now more divisive than ever before. 
 
Figure 15: impact of attitudes towards Europe on vote choice 
 
This goes to show the power of political activation. Even though negative attitudes 
towards Europe have not changed much over the last thirty years or so, they are now 
much more politically salient. Conservative voters in 2015 were not particularly 
Eurosceptic – and there was no significant difference between whether pro-Europeans 
or anti-Europeans voted for the party. Yet in 2017 the Tories’ approach to Brexit 
activated the issue of Europe to a much greater extent than previously seen. This had 
the benefit to the party of increasing its support among people who were hostile to 
Europe. But it also led to a decrease in support from people who were positive 
towards Europe, of which there were many.  
 
Meanwhile, Labour’s more ambiguous stance on Brexit succeeded in not alienating 
people who were anti-Europe – who voted for the party at roughly the same level as 
previously; while at the same time attracting the votes of pro-Europeans, who were 
much more likely to vote for Labour this time out, perhaps because they regarded the 
party as the lesser of two evils rather than out of any strong commitment.  
 
Given that people on low incomes tend to be more left-wing than average, but also 
somewhat more authoritarian and Eurosceptic –the 2017 general election presented 
low-income voters with a clear and compelling choice for the first time in a long time: 
Theresa May’s socially conservative vision of a ‘hard Brexit’ versus Jeremy Corbyn’s 
anti-austerity platform and populist cry to represent the ‘many not the few’. The 
clarity of this choice is no doubt one reason why both turnout among low-income 
voters increased and also support for each of the two major parties increased. But how 
did they navigate this choice? 
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To answer this question, we examine the impact of values on vote choice among low-
income voters (once again controlling for other demographic factors such as age and 
education). Figure 16 illustrates the impact of left-right attitudes on vote choice and 
authoritarian-liberal values on vote choice among this group. Figure 17 shows the 
impact of attitudes towards Europe. 
 
Figure 16: impact of values on vote choice among low-income voters, average 
marginal effect 
 
Even though people on low incomes are more socially authoritarian than people on 
high incomes, and have recently moved in a more authoritarian direction, there is little 
evidence that socially authoritarian people on low incomes vote differently to more 
socially liberal people on low incomes. As the right-hand panel of Figure 16 shows, the 
confidence intervals of the two lines overlap in many election years, including 2017, 
indicating that there is no significant difference between whether liberal (or 
authoritarian) people on low incomes vote Labour or Conservative. However, we do 
see a clear pattern with respect to left-right values. People on low incomes are more 
left-wing economically than people on high incomes, and the more left-wing a low-
income person is the more likely they are to vote Labour. This was particularly 
important in 2017 compared to more recent elections. 
 
The picture with respect to Europe among low-income voters is much less pronounced 
than it is among the electorate on the whole. Although there is some evidence that 
people on low incomes with a negative view of Europe are more likely to vote 
Conservative than people with a positive view of Europe, the difference is not great. 
This may be because their preference for left-wing economic policies acts as a buffer 
against them voting for the Conservatives on this issue, even though the party is closer 
to their views on the matter. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that support for the 
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Conservatives increased in 2017 among people on low incomes who held a negative 
view of Europe.  
 
Figure 17: impact of Europe on vote choice among low-income voters, average 
marginal effect 
 
Conclusion and implications 
Low-income voters occupy an increasingly important place in British elections. They 
are more likely to vote than previously, more volatile than other voters and at recent 
elections have been shifting their votes more than previously. They are, therefore, 
more ‘up for grabs’ than they have been for many years and they could yet make a big 
difference to who wins the next election. 
 
In 2017 somewhat unusually, both of Britain’s main parties made a pitch for their 
votes. On the one hand, the Conservatives made a bold play to appeal to the Brexit 
majority. On the other, Labour pitched to the material interests of those on low 
incomes by putting forward an unashamedly economically left-wing agenda. To a 
certain extent both of these strategies worked. Turnout among low-income voters was 
at its highest level for twenty years and both main parties saw their vote share among 
low-income voters increase. The Tories saw their highest vote share among low-
income voters in thirty years. Labour saw their highest vote share among low-income 
voters since Tony Blair’s second term.  
 
Yet ultimately Labour’s strategy can be seen as more successful as they registered the 
larger increase in the share of the vote among people on low incomes. People on low 
incomes are more left-wing economically and left-right issues played a particularly 
important role in the election, both in the electorate at large and among low-income 
voters in particular. Moreover, by de-emphasizing Brexit, Labour diffused an issue that 
could potentially have worked against them with this group. 
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Nonetheless, the Tories also have the potential to make greater inroads with these 
voters. They have seen their share of the vote among low-income voters increase in 
every election since 2001. The Tories are also closer to low-income voters on Europe, 
and support for social conservativism and law and order. By targeting an economic 
message that has more resonance with low-income voters they would help to break 
down an obstacle that is holding back their support. Putting the economic concerns of 
low-income voters centre stage could unlock this group for the Conservatives. There 
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Notes 
i For studies that reveal the importance of this divide see Heath and Goodwin (2017) and Ford and 
Goodwin (2014). 
ii We are extremely grateful to Laura Serra for research assistance putting the data together. 
iii We adopt the OECD equivalence weights, which are rescaled to a couple without children = 1. Each 
additional adult = 0.33 and a child living at home = 0.20. 
iv Turnout is measured by whether respondents reported having voted in the election, or not. Although 
survey estimates of turnout tend to over-report official turnout (Swaddle and Heath 1989) the BES 
survey estimates of non-voting closely follow trends over time from official data (Evans and Tilley 2011). 
v This is a ballpark figure. Nearly 47 million people were registered to vote in 2017. Those on the lowest 
20% of incomes therefore comprise about nine million people. If half of these are volatile then this 
equates to around 4-4.5 million volatile low-income voters. This though excludes people who are not 
registered to vote. 
vi All models control for income, education, occupation and subjective class identity. 
vii For the last item on redistribution until 2010 respondents were presented with a five-point scale from 
which to select their answer, but since 2015 they have been presented with a 10-point scale. In order to 
try and create a consistent response scale we recode the responses into three categories which refer to 
broadly positive, neutral and negative attitudes towards redistribution.  
viii We should note that the index does not contain items on attitudes towards homosexuality and 
gender equality, as these questions have not been asked in more recent surveys. The index therefore 
refers more to the role of government in the way that society operates than it does on personal 
freedoms and protected identities. 
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